Islam and State: A Study on Al-Mawardi and An-Nabhani’s thought and its Compatibility in Indonesian Context

Even though study concerning Islam and politics has been conducted by many researchers, few of them investigating about compatibility of Islamic political thoughts, which originated from the classical and medieval periods that have been influencing Islamic political movements and thoughts in Indonesia, with Indonesian Fathur Rohman, M. Hilali... Islam and State: A Study on... Page 244 Hayula, P-ISSN: 2549-0761, E-ISSN: 2548-9860 context. Thoughts of Imam al-Mawardi (lived in the 12 Century) and Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani (lived in the 20 Century) are some of them that should be mentioned in this regard. Islamic political thoughts of al-Mawardi become the main reference for Sunni Muslims who are majority in Indonesia, while Islamic political thought of alNabhani become the main guidance of HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) movement of which its members and followers are many in Indonesia. This article investigates about the political thoughts of al-Mawardi and al-Nabhani concerning the relationship between Islam and state as well as their compatibility with Indonesian context. This study uses the library research in which its primary resources are books written by al-Mawardi entitled Al-Ahkam al-Sulthaniyah and al-Nabhani entitled AdDaulah al-Islamiyah. By utilizing qualitative content analysis, data were collected and analyzed. This article argues that the Islamic political thought of al-Mawardi has been adopted by majority of Indonesian Sunni Muslims with some adjustments with Indonesian context, so that his thoughts become compatible with the concept of modern nation-state of Indonesia. On the other side, Islamic political thought of alNabhani which developed within a spirit of resistance to Western (European) colonialism has been adopted and campaigned by HTI without adjustment with Indonesian context. This causes al-Nabhani’s thought clashes with the concept of modern nation-state of Indonesia.


Introduction
The relationship between religion and state is an important topic in the social and political discourse of Indonesian society since the preparation of Indonesian independence, 1940s (Azra, 2012. In early modern Indonesian history, Muslims were generally divided in two different wings. The first group was those who prevented the state to be based on certain religion, particularly Islam (Assyaukanie, 2009;Basya, 2011). This group was commonly known as secular nationalist, or also called secularist. Soekarno (the first President of Republic of Indonesia, ruled in 1945Indonesia, ruled in -1966 and Moehammad Hatta (the first Vice President) were the representations of the secular nationalist. The second group was those who insisted in making Islam to be the foundation of the state, particularly in terms of state law, politics, and economic system (Assyaukanie, 2009;Basya, 2016). This group is commonly known as Islamist (Hamid, 2011). Debate and contestation between these two opposite groups, with slightly more complex groupings, not only took place in the early periods of Indonesian independence but also continues until next couple decades (Effendy, 2009).
The debate about the extent to which Islam might play its role in the state cannot be separated from the character of Islam growing up within a state (Lewis, 2002). Muhammad , the Prophet who delivered the messages of Islam, was not only a messenger of God, but was also a head of a state. Therefore, Islamic teachings was developing in a context in which it was involved in managing social and political life. It is not surprising that many ulama (religious scholars) and Muslim scholars believe that Islamic teachings extend over political and other worldly aspects (Lewis, 2002). However, they have various views in explaining how the detail relationship between Islam and the state (Ayoob, 2008).
One of the classical ulama who wrote about this topic was al-Mawardi (lived in the 10 th -11 th Century) who is a Syafi'ian scholar (Black, 2011). Al-Mawardi's thought became a reference of majority of Muslims who embrace Syafi'i madzhab (school of law) of which most Indonesian Muslims belong to. On the other side, there is a scholar named Taqiyudin al-Nabhani (20 th Century) who lived in modern era writing about the relationship between Islam and state. Al-Nabhani's thought about this topic is not only found in his books, but it is also manifested in an Islamic movement called Hizb al-Tahrir.
In Indonesia, al-Nabhani's ideas are represented and campaigned by the Hizbut Tahrir of Indonesia (HTI) (Maksum, 2017;Sabri et al, 2018 (Crone and Hinds, 2003). Karim et al., (2020) argue that leaders and society can interact well through a charismatic relationship. The complete term for the leader was khalifatu ar-rasul (the successor of the Prophet). It is worth noting that this term had been used in the first four Caliphs (Abu Bakar, Umar, Usman, and Ali), which was well-known as the Guided Caliphs (al-khulafa al-rashidun).
This term indicated that a Caliph is only an ordinary person who could make mistake during his rule, so that he invited people to contribute their ideas in improving the government as well as open or welcomed to be criticized by the people (Crone and Hinds, 2003). There was no divine dimension in the Caliph. In other words, the term means that the caliphate was merely a political institution maintaining social and religious life. One of the duties of the Caliph was to manage and establish religious (Islamic) teachings to be performed by Muslims.
This concept of caliphate shifted to be more sacred in the next periods under the Umayyad (7 th -8 th C), the Abbasid (8 th -13 th C), and the Ottoman (16 th -20 th C). The caliph meant by the Umayyad rulers was the deputy of God (Crone and Hinds, 2003). This was indicated, first of all, by its label named Khalifat Allah (Deputy of God) which means the agent selected by God to maintain social and religious life of Muslims. This concept implicated that the people were obliged to absolutely obey the caliphs, and therefore critique and rebellion to the caliphs would be regarded as a big sin that was unlawful for Muslims. This shift was also in line with the change of state concept which became patrimonial (Crone and Hinds, 2003). In patrimonial concept the state belonged to the ruler and his or her family, while the people are being subjects that would be protected by the ruler. Furthermore, the state was also conceptualized to be dynastic in which leadership was determined by kinship. The name of Umayyad and Abbasid indicates the caliphate belonged to the tribe of Umayyad and Abbasid.
Potential threat of Islamic sects, tension between the rulers and religious scholars (ulama), and conflict taking place in the end of the Guided Caliphs, particularly during Usman and Ali's rule, were some of the factors leading next caliphs in the Umayyad to conceptualize the institution to be sacred (Black, 2011). The Kharijite group who separated from Ali's supporters was one of the groups resisting and threatening political stability of Contestation in terms of religious authority with religious scholars, especially the ahl al-hadith movement, was also another factor making the Umayyad to conceptualize the idea of caliphate to be more sacred. The ahl al-Hadith movement viewed that the Umayyad government, including its governors, did not attach strictly to Prophet Tradition (Sunna) and too much relied on rationality in dealing with judgment, and consequently they regarded the rulers as not Islamic (Crone and Hinds, 2003). Therefore, the movement called the rulers to revive and refer to the Sunna.
Furthermore, resistance from non-Arabic people to the Umayyad rule also contributed to the shift of the concept of caliphate (Black, 2011). Due to wide expansion of Islam into new areas like Persia, Turkey, Africa, and Asia, there were many non-Arabic people becoming new citizens of the Islamic political institution. Those non-Arabic societies did not always agree and comfortable with Umayyad political policies, particularly policies related to Arabization which tended to undermine non-Arabic culture.
Those all aspects might be regarded by the Umayyad rulers as the pivotal factors imagined potentially threatened their political authority (Crone and Hinds, 2003). Although the concept of the caliphate was more sacred, it did not mean that the Umayyad was always successful in overcoming the potential threat. Rebellion of a group consisting of Abbas families allying with non-Arabic, particularly Persian and Turkish, was the evidence that the concept could not prevent the opponent of Umayyad from criticizing and attacking the rulers.
Similar concept of caliphate was also applied by Abbasid dynasty. Soon after destroying Umayyad, the Abbasid rule declared as the Islamic caliphate replacing Umayyad. The Abbasid claimed themselves as the kinship of Prophet's uncle, Abbas. It is worth noting that the concept of caliphate required the caliph to be part of Quraish tribe, as most Muslims believe that it was stated by the Prophet himself. The continuity of dynastic, patrimonial and sacred concept of the state was a contextual product in which Arabic people were still influenced by neo-tribalism (Crone and Hinds, 2003). By such a concept the Abbasid rulers expected that they could strengthen and consolidate their power maximally. Even though the political reality was not always as they expected, the concept was a formulation that was influenced by political and cultural context of civilization at this era.
Even though the Abbasid rulers were successful in obtaining good achievement in terms of philosophy and sciences, they had difficulty in managing local political power that took "political authority" much from the central government (caliph). There were some local powers, including military, emerging to be more autonomous and powerful from the caliph. Even in certain period beginning in the 9 th Century, the caliph functioned only as symbol, while the real political power was played by local power named Buyid (or Buwaihi) dynasty who embraced Shi'ite (Black, 2011). During this period, there were also two other political institutions claiming as the Islamic caliphate, namely Umayyad in Spain and Fatimid in Egypt. Therefore, contestation of authority and politics took place within Islamic world at this era.
Regardless of the disintegration and declining trend of political power during the middle until the end of the Abbasid rule, this Caliphate period was widely known as the era in which Muslims achieved their culmination in terms of sciences. Therefore, this Abbasid era was acknowledged as the golden age of Islamic civilization. It is not surprising that most Muslims memorize the history of caliphate in classical era as the good practice of this Islamic political institution's role. The concept of caliphate during the Abbasid rule was the political context in which al-Mawardi wrote his ideas concerning the relationship between religion (Islam) and the state that will be elaborated more in the next section. Even though this book did not clearly explain how and why people produce a state, al-Mawardi (2006) implicitly asserted that the state is not a product of "secular" social contract. The idea of social contract means that social interaction among people and necessity to build a safety in their interaction led the people to politically establish a state.

Al-Mawardi's thought on the relationship between religion and state
In this conception, the state is really a secular organization created for common interest of  (Crone and Hinds, 2003). Instead of offering ideal concept of state which is critical to the existing institution, al-Mawardi attempted to justify political reality that had been performed by Abbasid Caliphs. This is in line with argument of Black that most Muslim political thinkers in the classical era tended to make justification for their rulers (Black, 2011). Those thinkers did this due to political context that required them to be involved in assisting the rulers to establish a strong and stable political situation.

Al-Nabhani's thought on the relationship between religion and state
Al-Nabhani (2002) implicitly assert that a state is created by social contract. Even though there is no explicit explanation about this idea in al-Nabhani's book, the concept of bay'ah (allegiance) of people to their leader indicates about the concept of social contract.
In general, the practice of bay'ah had been conducted by all Caliphates since the Guided Caliphs until the Abbasid caliphate. Therefore, the concept of bay'ah is also found in al-Mawardi's thought. Nevertheless, the bay'ah in the Umayyad and Abbasid was restricted in terms of candidates of Caliphs that could be appointed. In these two dynasties, the concept of caliphate shifted to be patrimonial as has been explained in the previous section.
The concept of bay'ah of al-Nabhani is more similar with the one implemented in the Guided Caliphs. It is worth noting that al-Nabhani (2002)  states are established by people in order they are able to achieve religious (Islamic) goals. Islam and the state: 1) separating religion and the state; 2) uniting religion (Islam) and the state to be integral; 3) complementary relationship between religion and the state.

The compatibility of al-Mawardi and al-Nabhani's political thoughts in
The first group views that religion including Islam is not compatible with principles of modern state. The proponent of this type is called secularist. The secularist views that political power does not derive from God, so that the power is not sacred and absolute. The sovereignty belongs to people. All aspects related to social and public affairs should be discussed by people. State policies and regulations should be based on "public good". In al-Nabhani's thought was just begun to be disseminated recent last three or two decades.
Hizbut Tahrir was indeed established by al-Nabhani himself in Palestine, and this organization then emerged in many countries including in non-Muslim countries like Europe (Zulkarnain, 2020). It can be concluded that the HT is the manifestation of al-Nabhani's political thought. In Indonesia the movement is called Hizbut Tahrir of Indonesia (HTI).
Therefore, the HTI is also the representation of al-Nabhani's thought. Since the beginning of the post-New Order (1998), after the collapse of Soeharto regime , the HTI played its role in campaigning for the establishment of sharia-based state and Caliphate (Sabri, Iksan, and Wekke, 2018). The context of the post-New Order in which Indonesian economy was in crisis was the momentum taken by the HTI. This Islamic movement claimed that the Indonesian economic crisis was caused by the reluctance of Indonesian government to implement sharia (Sabri, Iksan, and Wekke, 2018

Conclusion
The relationship between Islam and the state has been being a heated topic, because on the one hand many Muslims believe that Islam is not only about faith and rituals, but also covers social and political life. On the other hand, contemporary societies require social and political life to be managed by rationalism or modern sciences. It is worth noting that the domination of rationalism or modern sciences might impact to secularization of social and political life, while to integrate religion (Islam) and the state would make the state to work for the mission and goals of Islam which is contradictory with the nature of modern state. These two positions might lead Muslims to be confused. Therefore how Muslims deal with these two positions is the concerns of this topic.
This article describes about thoughts of two Muslim thinkers, al-Mawardi and al-Nabhani, living in different period (classical and modern). The focus of this article is to investigate their thoughts concerning the relationship between religion (Islam) and the state, how their thoughts spread and develop in Indonesia, and the extent to which their compatibility within Indonesian context.
Al-Mawardi's thought concerning the relationship between Islam and the state was produced in a particular context in which Islam has privilege position in the state, religion of people (citizens) became terms of reference for the state in treating them, and imperium was regarded as the most powerful political institution. Therefore adopting al-Mawardi's thought without contextualizing it would make the thought incompatible with the nature of modern Indonesian state. This has been recognized by Indonesia Sunni Muslims. Tension and conflict taking place among Indonesian Muslims since the preparation of Indonesian independence until later next several decades led them to evaluate and rethink about Islamic political thoughts they learned from classical ulama including from al-Mawardi.
Even though they adopt al-Mawardi's thought, they have reinterpreted and contextualized it in order to be compatible with plural and modern Indonesian context. This is not the case with al-Nabhani' thought. Al-Nabhani's thought was constructed in a modern context in which many Muslim countries were being colonized by Western (European) states. While colonizing and exploiting natural resources of Muslim lands, those colonial governments brought "western" modern culture as well as modern sciences.
The spirit of al-Nabhani's thought is to criticize and fight against western modern system and civilization. Therefore, reinterpreting al-Nabhani's thought might be perceived by his followers would reduce or even mislead his main ideas.